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INTRODUCTION 
When the Council adopted the modified Financial Regulation on 13 March 1990 
the Commission entered the following statement in the  minutes~ 
"The  Commission  undertakes  to  study  the  possibility  of  improving  the 
treatment  of  borrowing/lending  operations  in  Community  budget  documents. 
It will submit the conclusions of its study before the end of 1991." 
The subsequent growth of borrowing/lending operations involving non-member 
countries  has  only  increased . the  need  for  this  review  and  has,  to  some 
extent, changed the context. 
In  line with the Commission's undertaking, this report: 
describes the current treatment and history of these operations; 
presents  new  factors  which  have  since  arisen  to  change  the  overall 
context and the question of borrowing and lending; 
discusses  the  various  proposals  which  could  be  made  for  the 
improvement of budgetary presentation. 
In  view  of  the  purpose  of  this  report,  the  Commission  has  seen  fit  to 
include  it  with  the  other  proposals  and  reports  making  up  the  Delors II 
package. 
I.  CURRENT SITUATION AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The  EEC  Treaty  does  not  contain  any  prov1s1ons  which  expressly  authorize 
the  Commission  to  conduct  borrowing  and  lending  operations  on  the 
Community's behalf. 
On  the  ECSC Treaty  (Articles 49,  51,  54  and  56)  and  the  Euratom  Treaty 
(Article 172(4))  provide  for  the  use  of  borrowing  and  lending  instruments 
in  the  areas  they  cover,  on  condition  that  they  are  not  used  to  finance  a 
budget deficit. 1 
1  Article  51(1)  ECSC: 
"The  High  Authority  may  not  use  the  funds  obtained by  borrowing except 
to grant  loans." - 4 -
Up  to  now,  for  policies  falling  within  the  EEC Treaty,  the  legal  base  used 
has  been  Article 235  or,  where  applicable,  the  specific  legal  base  for 
policy  to  which  the  instrument  related  (Article 108 EEC  for  the  balance  of 
payments facility or Article 2 Euratom  for Euratom borrowing and lending). 
The development of EEC  financial  instruments covered  by the general  budget 
·can be divided into four stages. 
In  the  first stage,  there  was  no  borrowing  and  lending  under the  EEC 
Treaty;  these  operations  were carried  out only  by the  ECSC,  Euratom 
or the EIB. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  sixties,  the  need  to  develop  Community 
solidarity  as  part  of  the  customs  union  prompted  operations  to 
support  Member  States  facing  balance  of  payments  difficulties. 
Euratom operations were also incorporated in the general budget. 
The  economic  crisis  which  began  in  1973 made  it even  more  vital  to 
increase  Community  solidarity  and  led  to  the  various  NCis  initiated · 
between 1  978 and  1982. 
Two  new  instruments  were  introduced  in  the  seventies:  the  New 
Community  Instrument  (NCI)  to  support  investment  by  small  and 
medium-sized  firms  and  the  overall  guarantee  from  the  general  budget 
for EIB  loans to Mediterranean countries for microeconomic purposes. 
Events in  Eastern  Europe  from 1989 onwards  resulted  on the one hand 
in  an  extension  of  the  guarantee  given  to  the  EIB  so  that  it  could 
grant  loans  to  the  countries  of  Central  arid  Eastern  Europe - Poland 
and  Hungary  to  begin  with,  followed  by  Czechoslovakia·,  Bulgaria  and 
Romania - and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  first  borrowing  and  lending 
operation involving a non-member country - Hungary - in  early 1990. 
Other  borrowing  and  lending  operations  for  macroeconomic  purposes 
followed,  not  only  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria  and  Romania)  but  also  in  Mediterranean  countries  (Israel, 
Algeria). 
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Recently,  the food  aid  scheme  for the ex-Soviet Union  resulted  in two 
operations of a new kind: 
- an  EEC  guarantee to a  pool of commercial banks in respect of a  loan 
to finance imports of food products; 
- a  borrowing/lending  facility  also  financing  imports  of  food 
products. 
It could  be  expected  that  other  borrowing  and  lending  operations  will 
be  added  to  these· in  the  future:  new  EIB  operations,  new  financial 
assistance  loans  to  third  countries,  d~velopment  of  trans-European 
networks, for example. 
As  there  are  no  specific  prov1s1ons  in  the  Treaty,  a  variety  of 
instruments have  developed  without any overall framework.  The 1992 
budget  thus  contains  sixteen  headings  with  a  token  entry,  covering 
outstanding capital of ECU  11  190 million  at 31  December 1991. 
At the  end  of 1991  the  maximum potential  risk  in  capital  and  interest 
covered  by  the  budget  up  to  the  end  of  the  century  came  to 
ECU  27.3 billion. 
B.  MAIN FEATURES  OF THE INSTRUMENTS 
Depending on the legal  nature of the operation guaranteed  by the Community 
budget, a distinction must be  made between borrowing and  lending operations 
and guarantees. 
1 .  Borrowing and lending 
The Commission contracts borrowings on the Community's behalf and 
the  yield  is  on-lent  to  third  parties  on  the  same  conditions  as 
regards  the  amount,  the  term,  the  rate  and  the  dates  for  the 
payment of interest. 
The risk for the budget is that the sum borrowed by the Community 
must  be  repaid  on  the  due  date  even  if the  recipient  of the  loan 
defaults. - 6-
A  distinction is thus made between: 
· -· borrowing/lending  operations  for  macroeconomic  purposes  in the 
Member States: balance of payments loans; 
borrowing/lending  operations  for  microeconomic  purposes  in  the 
Member States: Euratom and  NCI  operations; 
- borrowing/lending  operations  for  macroeconomic  purposes  in 
non-member  countries:  medium-term  financial  assistance  loans 
(Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  Bulgaria,  Romania,  Algeria,  Israel 
and food aid to the Soviet Union  and  its Republics). 
the  medium-term loan to the  Republics of the ex-Soviet Union in 
the form of a  medium-term borrowing and  lending operation with 
~  three  year  duration  for  the  financing  of  agricultural  and 
food  ·products. 
2.  Guarantees 
The  risk  for  the  budget  is  represented  by  the  Community's 
undertaking  to  service  the  loan  if  a  debtor  defaults  (capital, 
interest and, if necessary, interest penalties). 
The following guarantees apply: 
- The  guarantee  granted  to  the  EIB  in  respect  of  projects  it 
finances  outside  the  Community.  This  guarantee  covers  the. 
entire  loan,  except  in  the  case  of  operations  under  the 
Mediterranean  protocols,  for  which  the total .amount  covered  by 
the  guarantee  may not exceed  75% of the total amount of loans 
contracted. 
The  ECU  500 million  guarantee  given  to  a  pool  of  banks  in 
respect  of  a  credit  granted  to  the  Soviet Union  to  finance 
imports  of  agricultural  products  and  foodstuffs  from  the 
Community and the countries of Eastern and  Central Europe. 
The  budgetary  undertaking  takes  the  form  of  the  signature  of  a · 
guarantee  agreement  between  the  Community  and  the  institution 
guaranteed. 
However,  despite  these  differences  in  the  economic  and  legal  nature 
of  the  risk,  the  consequences  of  default  for  the  budget  are  identical 
in every case and  budgetary treatment of these operations is  similar. - 7 -
C.  CURRENT TREATMENT 
1 .  Legislation 
Under  the  current  .  borrowing/lending  arrangements,  the  basic 
decision  authorizing  the  operation  is  adopted  by  the  Council 
after' consulting Parliament. 
Parliament  may  invoke  the  conciliation  procedure  provided  for  by 
the Joint Declaration of 4  March 1975.1 
2.  Financial perspective 
The  current  Financial  Perspective  for  1988-92  does  not  contain 
any  specific  amount  for  activation  of  the  guarantee  when 
beneficiaries  of  borrowing/lending  operations  default.  When  the 
Financial  Perspective  was  drawn  up  in  1988,  it  was  considered 
that the  budget  risk  was  small  since  most of the  operations  took 
place within the Community. 
3.  Budget 
3.1  Budget presentation 
The  budgetary  authority  is  not  called  on  to  authorize 
borrowing  and· lending  operations;  however,  it does  authorize 
the guarantees for them. 
At  present,  the  general  budget  performs  a  dual  role  in 
respect of borrowing/lending operations: 
- it provides the guarantee; 
- it  provides  information  in  Annex II  to  Section Ill 
(Commission). 
1  OJ  C  89,  22.4.1975. - 8 -
(a)  Guarantee 
Article 20(5) of the Financial Regulation states that: 
"The  budget  shall  show .  . .  as  regards  borrowing  and 
lending operations ... 
in the Commission section: 
the  budget  headings  relating  to  the  categories  of 
operation  and  carrying  a  token  entry,  so  long  as  no 
effective  charge  which  has  to  be  covered  by  specific 
resources has arisen, 
remarks  giving  a  reference  to  the  legal  basis  and, 
where  appropriate,  the  volume  of  the  operations 
envisaged  and  the  financial  guarantee  given  by  the 
Communities in respect of these operations ...  " 
This  heading  in  the  statement  of  expenditure- which 
initially  carries  a  token  entry - represents  the 
guarantee  of  the  EEC' s  undertaking  towards  lenders  if 
loan  recipients  default  on  repayment  on  the  due  dates. 
After  funds  have,  if  necessary,  been  drawn  provisionally 
from  cash  resources,  appropriations  are  allocated  to 
this  heading  by  means  of  transfers  or  a  supplementary 
budget. 
The  statement  of  revenue  also  contains  a  heading 
carrying  a  token  entry  to  accommodate  any  subsequent 
repayments by defaulters. 
(b)  Information in  Annex II 
Article 20(5)(c)  of  the  Financial  Regulation  states  that 
information· should  be  provided  in  a document annexed  to 
the Commission section,  as  an indication; on 
current ·  .capital 
management, 
operations  and  current  debt 
the  capital  operations  and  debt  management  for  the 
financial year in  question. 
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The  purpose  of  this  annex  is  to  provide  the  budgetary 
authority  with  a  record  of borrowing  and  lending  operations 
so  that  it  can  obtain  an  overall  picture  of  the  potential 
risks borne by the general budget. 
3.2  Revenue and expenditure account and balance sheet 
3.2.1  Revenue and expenditure account 
The  revenue  and  expenditure  account  sets  out  actual 
exp""enditure  on  guarantees  for  borrowing  and  lending 
operations  (Title 80-2  of  the  general  budget).  The 
only  sector . in  which  these  guarantees  have  been 
activated  is  in  cooperation  with  non-member 
countries. 
The  1989 revenue  and  expenditure  account  contained 
ECU  4. 170 million  under the heading covering the EEC 
guarantee  for  loans  granted  by  the  EIB  to  third 
countries  in  the  chapter  for  cooperation  with 
Mediterranean countries.  The same  heading contained 
ECU  12.746 million  in  payments  for  1990.  These 
amounts  are  ·accounted  for  by  payments  of  the 
guarantee in respect of Syria and  Lebanon. 
3.2.2  Balance sheet 
The balance sheet contains the following two items: 
(a)  Community guarantee 
The  Community  guarantee  appears  under 
"commitments not included in the balance sheet": 
- as  the  guarantee  for  the  repayment  of 
borrowings  contracted  by  the  European 
Communities  which  carries  a  token  entry,  since 
the corresponding borrowings are shown together 
w•th  the  amount  involved  on  the  liabilities 
side of the balance sheet; - 10: 
- as  the  guarantee  for  the  repayment  of  loans 
granted  by  the  EIB  from  its  own  resources  to 
non-member 'countries;  the  amount .indicated  for 
this  guarantee  (ECU  2  251 .8 million  at the  end 
. of  1990)  corresponds  to. 75%  of  outstanding 
loans  under  the  Mediterranean  protocols  (the 
percentage  guaranteed)  or  100% in  the  case  of 
other loans, 
(b)  Outstanding loans 
A  table  attached  to  the  balance  sheet  contains  a 
forecast  of  the  amount  of  guaranteed  EIB  loans 
outstanding  up  to  the  expiry  of the  final  loan  on 
the basis of the amounts disbursed. 
4.  Evaluation of risk 
Figures  are  provided  in  Annex II  to  the  budget.  In  its  reports, 
the  Court  of  Auditors  usually  makes  a  more  qualitative  analysis 
of the risk situation. 
5.  Control 
These  operations  are  submitted  to  Financial  Control  and  the  Court 
of Auditors. 
5.1  Financial Control 
Financial  Control  gives  its  approval  at  the  proposed  stage 
relating  to  ECSC,  Euratom,  NCI  and  balance  of  payments 
loans. 
5.2  Court of Auditors 
The  Court  of  Auditors  examines  the  accounts  for  all 
Community  revenue  and  expenditure  on  the  basis  of 
Article 206a  of  the  Treaty  and  audits  borrowing  and  lending 
operations  conducted  outside  the  budget  in  the  same  way  as 
budget  revenue  and  expenditure.  The  Court's  comments  are 
contained  in  its  annual  report,  which  is  examined  by 
Parliament  as  part  of  the  dischmgc  procedure  and  by  the 
Council when drawing up its discharge recommendation. - 11  -
Recently  the  Court  produced  special  report 3/90  on  ECSC, 
Euratom and  NCI  borrowing and  lending operations. 
The  Court  thus  conducts  a  wide-ranging  examination  of  the 
legality,  regularity  and  sound  financial  management  of 
borrowing  and  lending  operations.  The  Commission  is 
required  to  supply  it,  on  request,  with  all  the  information 
it considers necessary (Article 206a(3)  of the Treaty). 
For  the monitoring of EIB  loans  guaranteed  by the Community 
budget,  the  Commission,  the  Court  and  the  Bank  have 
concluded  a  tripartite  agreement  on  cooperation  in  control 
procedures. - , 2 -
II.  GREATER TRANSPARENCY FOR BORROWING  AND LENDING OPERATIONS 
A.  TREATMENT OF BORROWING AND LENDING OPERATIONS IN BUDGET 
DOCUMENTS AND EVALUATION BY THE BUDGETARY AUTHORITY 
I 
As· the  Treaty  has  recently  been  revised  without  any  change  to  the 
budgetary  provisions,  the  Commission  can  see  no  point  in  reopening · 
the issue of "budgetising" borrowing and lending operations. 
However,  the  Commission  feels  that  treatment  could· be  improved  at 
three levels: 
1.  New structure for budget documents 
To  increase  the  transparency  of  financial  operations,  the  actual 
presentation  of budget  information  should  also  be  improved.  The 
Commission  considers  that  in  future  the  budget  should  consist  of 
two separate volumes: 
(a)  ·  Volume I  would  consist  of  the  general  budget  itself.  Its 
composition  would  remain  the same and  it would  also  contain 
r  the  headings,  with  token  entries,  representing  the  guarantee 
in  respect of borrowing/lending operations. 
(b)  Volume II  (see  Annex I)  would  be  devoted  exclusively  to 
borrowing/lending  operations.  In  practice,  it  would 
therefore  replace  the  current  Annex II  to  Section Ill 
(Commission).·· 
This would have two advantages: 
- The  argument  about  the  full  "budgetization"  of  borrowing  and 
lending  operations  would  not be  rekindled  since  Volume I  would 
contain  all  the  budgetised  elements,  which would  be  authorized 
by the budgetary authority. 
/ 
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- Capital  operations  (borrowing/lending)  would  be  presented  in  a 
separate volume with the same  standing,  if not the same status, 
providing  all  the  information  needed  for  evaluation  by  the 
budgetary authority. 
This  new  presentation  is  more  satisfactory  in  that  it  would  set 
out all  aspects of the  Community's finances  in  a  single  document. 
It  is  evident  that  borrowing/lending  operations  contribute  to  the 
implementation  of. Community  policies,  even  though  the  financial 
and technical arrangements are different. 
2.  Information 
The  indicative  information  contained  in  the  current  annex  would 
be  improved  if  a  separate  volume  were  devoted  to 
borrowing/lending  operations.  Every  effort  would  be  made  to 
provide  better  forward  information.  The  t.udgetary  authority 
would  then  be  better  informed  about  the  planned  pace  of 
operations  even  though  the  value  of  forecasts  in  this  field  is 
only  relative.  As  borrowings  are  always  contracted  to  match 
actual  requests  for  loans,  any  forecasting  exercise  is 
automatically  subject  to  external  factors  which,  by  definition, 
are beyond the Commission's control. 
3.  The  budgetary  authority's  assessment  of  borrowing  and  lending 
operations 
At  present,  the  Financial  Regulation  does  not  lay  down  any 
procedure  for  the  use  to  be  made  of Annex II,  which  is  provided 
by  way  of  information.  The  Regulation  could  include  an 
additional  title  on  specific  provisions  for  borrowing  and  lending 
operations,  comprising  all  the  provisions  relating  to  these 
. operations.  A  new article  would  be  introduced  to the  effect  that 
"in  adopting  the  budget,  the  budgetary  authority  shall  make  an 
assessment  of  the  conditions  of  implementation  of the  borrowing 
and  lending operations." 
I 
\ 
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B.  CLOSER MONITORING OF RISKS:  SBX-MONTHL  Y REPORT TO 
THE  BUDGETARY AUTHORITY 
In view of the  growing  risk guaranteed  by the Community budget as  a 
result  of  the  extension  of  aid  to  non-member  countries,  and  in 
response  to  the  concern  expressed  by  the  budgetary  authority,  the 
Commission gave an undertaking in a statement made when the vote was 
taken on supplementary and  amending  budget No 1/91  to report to the 
budgetary  authority  twice  a  year  on  budget  guarantees  and  the 
corresponding risks. 
The first such report was in four parts: 
- a description of the· risks covered by the budget at 30 June 1991; 
- an  outline  of  operations  not  yet  entered  in  the  budget  but  for 
which proposals had been made by the Commission; 
- the  situation  as  regards  risks  for  the  budget  in  future  years  and 
guarantees already activated; 
- assessment  of  the  situation  of  non-Community  countries  benefiting 
from  operations  guaranteed  by  the  general  budget  (see  Annex II  for 
the risks situation at 31  December 1991 ). 
The  budgetary  authority  will  thus  be  kept  informed  about  the  size  of 
risks  borne  by  each  future  budget  as  a  result  of  operations  already 
under  way,  operations  on  which  a  deCision  has  been  taken  but  in 
respect  of which  no  amounts  have  yet  been  disbursed  and  operations 
proposed  by  the  Commission  but  on  which  the  Council  has  still  not 
taken a decision. 
The  six-monthly  reports  combined  with  the  improved  information 
provided  by the budget documents  will enable  the  Commission  and  the 
budgetary  authority  to  maintain  almost  continual  monitoring  of  the 
risk situation. 
C.  MORE EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES  FOR  ENTERING  IN THE BUDGET 
AMOUNTS CONNECTED WITH ANY ACTIVATION OF THE GUARANTEE 
2 
The  Community  is  always  in  a  position  to  honour  its  undertakings  to 
third  parties,  since  provisional  recourse  to  its  cash  resources,  as 
provided  for  in  Article 12  of  Regulation  1552/89,2  makes  it  possible 
to meet whatever payment obligations may arise pending the budgetary 
settlement of a claim. 
l 
', 
OJ  L  155,  7.6.1988.  ,I 
} 
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While  there  are  no  problems  concerning  the  reimbursement  of  the 
Community's  creditors,  in  view  of  the  development  of  the  financial 
iQstruments ·connected  with  the  budget  guarantee  for  non-Community 
countries, it is now essential to improve procedures  . 
. .  1  ~· · ·Proposal  for  a  reserve  for  guarantees  to  be  included  in  the 
· financial perspective 
The object would be as follows: 
- to take account of the risk in the Financial Perspective; 
- to  lay  down  a  clear  procedure  for  entering  in  the  budget  any 
amount involved in activation of the guarantee: 
- to avoid  mobilizing  prematurely  budgetary  funds  which  could  be 
used more effectively for other purposes. 
1.1  A  reserve in the Financial Perspective 
The  reserve  would  be  entered  for  a  given  amount  in  the 
Financial  Perspective  unc'er  a  heading  for  exceptional 
expenditure. 
In· the  event of default,  the  Community's  creditors  would,  as 
at  present,  be  repaid  immediately,  if  necessary  from  cash 
resources. 
The  budgetary adjustment  for any drawing  on cash  resources 
would  involve  mobilizing  from  the  reserve  the  amount  still 
to be covered after: 
- redeployment  of  a  fixed  minimum  from  appropriations 
available  (tr<lnsfers) and,  if necessary 
- utilization  of  the  margin  available  below  the  ceiling  for 
the  corresponding  heading  in  the  Financial  Perspective 
(supplementary  /amending budget). 
Should  the  amount  required  for  the  guarantee  exceed  the 
amount  of  the  reserve,  the  procedure  for  revising  the 
Financial Perspective would be set in  motion. 
When  non-repayment  is  certain  (rescheduling,  total  and 
definitive  default,  etc.),  the  budget  headings  covering 
guarantee~ would  be  allocated  the  necessary  amounts  in  the 
initial budget, if necessary by activating the reserve. 
I 
) 
j 
I 
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1.2  Amount of the reserve 
The  amount  of  the  reserve  could  correspond  to  a  fixed 
percentage  each  year  of  the  amount  due  in  capital  and 
interest  payments  as  known  at  the  time  of  the  technical 
adjustment  of  the  Financial  Perspective  in  February  of  the 
year  in  question.  What  the  Commission  would  have .  to  do 
would  be  to  earmark  for  this  purpose  part  of a  "reserve  for 
exceptional  expenditure"  to  be  inserted  in  the  new  Financial 
Perspective for 1993-97. 
The  advantage  of a  reserve  calculated  in  this  way  is  that  it 
would  faithfully  reflect  the  maximum  risks  actually· borne  by 
the budget each year. 
If  this  solution  were  to  be  envisaged,  the  figure  to  be 
adopted  could  be  modelled  on  the  prudential  ratios  applied 
by  the  leading  international  financial  institutions:  EIB, 
World Bank,  EBRD,  etc.,  or  that  defined  in  Council  Directive 
647/89  applicable  to  financial  institutions,  which  is  at  8% 
of the  outstanding  capital  amount  weighted  by the  nature  of 
the risks. 
In  order  to  give  a  first  indication  of  its  size,  it  is 
proposed  to  use,  among  these  ratios,  the  relationship 
between  the  institution's  paid-up  capital  and  reserves  on 
the  one  hand  and  the  amount  of  loans . outstanding  on  the 
other,  which  seems  closest  to  the  characteristics  of  the 
reserve.  It  represents  the  threshold  beyond  which  the 
subscribed  but  unpaid  capital  will  in  fact  have  to  be  called 
in  from the shareholders. 
Although  this  ratio  is  applied  to  stocks  (re.s~rves  which  may 
be  used  over  a  number  of  years  and  loans  outstanding 
similarly  repayable  over  a  number  of  years),  it  can  be 
considered  a  good  assessment  of  immediate  risks  and  be 
applied to flows. 
Tim  ratio  ranuns  from  10.7%  for  the  EIO,  13.4%  for  tlw 
World Bank  and 30% for the EBRD.  Given the nature of EEC 
operations,  the  figure  for  the  EEC  could  be  midway  between 
the  EIB  and  the  EBRD  figures.  The  EEC  risk  covers  a  wider 
geographical  area  than  that  of  the  EBRD  but  involves  more 
operations  with  a  single  debtor  than  is  the  case  of  the  EIB 
or the World Bank. 
A  figure of 20% could therefore be  envisaged initially. ..  17 -
On  the· basis  of  amounts  already  disbursed,  decided  and 
proposed by the Commission at 31  December 1991,  the amount 
of  the  reserve  for  guarantees  would  vary  between 
ECU  232.8 million  in  1993 and  ECU  378.2 million  in  1999 as 
shown in the table below. 
Amount  (situation at  31  December  1991)  of  a  reserve equal to 20% 
of annual  risks  involving  non-Community  countries 
Year 
Amount 
(ECU  million) 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
232.8  i  272  353  263.8  378.2  333.6  323 
It  would  still  be  necessary  of  course  to  evaluate  the  potential 
development  of  borrowing/lending  operations  subject  to  the 
constraint of maintaining a  20% ratio  between the amount of the 
reserve  in  the  financial  perspective  and  the  amounts  of 
repayments  due  annually.  As  a  guide,  and  assuming  for  the 
sake  of  simplicity  that  the  structure  of  amounts  outstanding 
and repayments due remains  unchanged,  a reserve for guarantees 
of  ECU  600 million  by  1997  would  make  it  possible  to 
approximately  double  the  value  of  borrowing/lending  opcmtions 
for non-member countries. 
1.3  Advantages of the reserve mechanism 
A  reserve of this typP would offer the following advantages: 
- it  would  legitimately  place  a  charge  on  the  Community's 
financial  margin  of  manoeuvre  beneath  the  own  resources 
ceiling; 
- it would  ensure  that  due  allowance  was  made  for the  risks 
borne  by  the  budget  each  year,  while  at  the  same  time 
allowing new operations to be  mounted; 
I 
I 
) 
\ 
l 
~ 
I 
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- it  would  be  preferable  to  the  allocation  of  appropriations 
to  the  headings  currently  carrying  token  entries,  which 
would. have the drawback of highlighting  certain  States and 
giving  the  impression  of  acceptance  of the  fact  that  they 
will not pay their debts; 
- it  would  not  involve  premature  mobilization  of  funds  but 
would  make  it  possible  to  enter  the  guarantee  in  the 
budget  without  unduly  disrupting  budget  implementation 
should the guarantee be  activated; 
- it  would  considerably  reduce  the  risk  of  having  to  resort 
to  the  lengthy  procedure  of  revising  the  Financial 
Perspective. 
2.  An  alternative  to  establish  a  guarantee  fund  combined  with  the 
reserve for guarantees 
2.1  Guarantee Fund 
The  constitution  of a  Guarantee  Fund  would  make it possible · 
to  provide  partial  cover  for  the  risk  ex ante;  the  reserve 
mechanism does this ex post. 
The  Guarantee  Fund  would  have  to  represent  a  minimum 
percentage  of  the  outstanding  .  capital  of  operations · 
guaranteed  by the Community budget.  Any new deCision  (or 
disbursement)  relating  to  such  an  operation  .  would . 
automatically  entail  payment  of the corresponding  sum to  the 
guarantee fund, 
For  EIB  loans,  which  are  disbursed  throughout  the  year,  the 
payment could  be  calculated  as  a fixed amount extending over 
the  period  during  which  the  amounts  involved  are  being 
disbursed.  For  instance,  for  the  loans  to  Poland  and  Hungary 
totalling  ECU  1 000 million  over  a  period  of.  three  years, 
the payment to a 10% Guarantee Fund would be ECU  100 million 
over  three  years.  Another  approach  would  be  to  adjust 
payments  on  the  basis  of  statements  from  the  EIB  of  the 
amount of loans disbursed. 
For  medium-term  financial  assistance  loans,  the.  payment 
would  have  to  correspond  to  the  tranches to  be  disbursed 
during the year. - 19 -
Two solutions would be  possible for existing operations: 
(a)  The  Fund  could  be  constituted  over a  number of years by 
means of annual  allocations  drawing  on the margin of the 
reserve. 
(b)  A  higher  percentage  could  be  paid  in  respect  of  the 
initial . operations.  For  instance  if  the  Fund  is  to  be 
10%  of  the  amount  outstanding,  the  levy  on  initial 
operations would be  20%. 
The  amounts  in  the  Fund  would  be  invested  and  the  financial 
yield adrted  to the fund's capital. 
2.2  Amount of the Guarantee Fund:  in  principle 10% 
The  Guarantee  Fund  could  in  principle  be  10% of the amount 
of  loans  outstanding,  on  the  pattern  of  what  is  practised  by 
financial  institutions  concerning  the  relationship  between 
paid-up  capital  and  loans  outstanding  (e.g.  EIB:  7.9%  at  31 
December 1990; Wolrd Bank:  10% at 30 June 1990). We could 
use  the  figure  fixed  in  the  directive  of  the  Council  on 
solvency  ratio  of  the  firms  of  credit  which  recommends  a 
minimal  ratio  of  8%  with  the  outstanding  amounts  of  the 
loans weighted  by the nature of the risks. 
2.3  Coordination with the Reserve 
The Guarantee Fund  would work in  conjunction with a  reserve 
of the  same  nature  in  the  Financial  Perspective.  The  amount 
of  the  reserve  could  be  smaller  than  in  the  first  proposal 
and could  in fact be  fixed. 
The Guarantee Fund  would be  drawn on ahead of the Reserve. 
The  two  instruments  would  work  together  as  follows:  the 
Reserve  would  be  drawn  on  for  any  increases  to  match  the 
growth  in  amounts  outstanding  or to  replenish  the  Guarantee 
Fund  if it were exhausted. 
The  fixed  amount  of  the  Reserve  associated  with  the 
Guarantee  Fund  could  be  ECU  300 million.  Half  could  be 
used  in  the  first  years  of  the  period  1993-97  to  constitute 
the initial Guarantee Fund. - 20-
2.4  Legislative requirements 
The creation of a  Guarantee  Fund  would  require  the insertion 
of  appropriate  clauses  in  the  Financial  Regulation.  There 
is  at  present  no  fund  in  the  Community's  financial  system 
which  stores  resources  for  some  uncertain  future 
expenditure.  If such  an  instrument  were  to  be  set  up,  the 
conditions for the management of the amount paid to the fund 
and  the  rules  for  transferring  from  the  fund  to  the  budget 
the  amounts  required  in  the  event  of  activation  of  the 
guarantee would have to be adopted. 
2.5  Assessment 
The advantage  of a  Guarantee  Fund  is  that it would  then  no 
longer  be  necessary  to  make · transfers,  with  the  attendant 
disruption  of  budget  implementation,  if  the  guarantee  were 
activated;  it  would  also  make  it  possible  to  reduce  the 
amount  of  the  Reserve  for  Guarantees  in  the  Financial 
Perspective. 
However,  to  constitute  the  reserve,  financial  resources 
would have to be  called  in ahead of needs and,  what is  more, 
unnecessarily  if  the  guarantee  were  not  in  fact  activated. 
Special  mechanisms  (investment  of  the  amount  in  the 
Guarantee  Fund)  would  also  have to be set up,  in  addition to 
the necessary changes to legislation. 
Also,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  mechanism  of  a  Guarantee 
Fund  is  better  adapted  to  the  situation  of  financial 
establishments  with  its  own  balance  sheet,  than  to  an 
institution  with  a  budget.  No  Member  State,  for  example, 
uses a Guarantee fund in  this way in  its budget. 
In  addilinn,  ;1  G••ar;ulll!l!  Fund  wo11ld  only  lw  a  parti;d 
solution,  because  the  intervention  of  the  Fund  would  be 
limited  by  its  size,  requiring  thus  use  of  the  Reserve  if  it 
were exhausted. 
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Ill.  CONCLUSIONS 
In  view  of  the  new  situation  as  regards  borrowing/lending  operations  and 
the · granting  of  guarantees  for  non-member  countries,  the  Commission 
considers  that  greater  transparency  in  this  field - an  essential  condition 
for  taking  well-founded  political  decisions - could  be  achieved  by  action 
on three fronts: 
1  .  A  better  substantiated  and  more  explicit  assessment  by the  budgetary 
authority  of  the  risks  arising  from  borrowing/lending  operations  and 
existing and  planned guarantees,  and the management of operations. 
This  assessment,  based  on  improved  budget  documents,  would  be 
conducted during the budgetary procedure. 
2.  Closer monitoring of risks 
Twice a  year, the Commission will present an  assessment report on the 
situation  as  regards  guarantees  from  the  Community  budget, 
incorporating  and  supplementing  the  information  supplied  to  the 
budgetary authority in the budget documents. 
In  this  way,  there  would  be  virtually  continuous  monitoring  of  the 
situation as  regards guarantees. 
3.  More  effective  procedurej  for  entering  in  the  budget  amounts 
connected with any activation of the guarantee 
The  guarantee  now  offered  to  the  Community's  creditors  is  entirely 
satisfactory. 
However,  a  reserve - forming  part  ot  the  reserve  for  exceptional 
expenditure  to  be  inserted  in  the  Financial  Perspective  for  1993-97 -
would  make  for  more  transparency  as  regards  risks,  eliminate  delays 
arising  from  any  need  to  revise  the  Financial  Perspective  and  reduce 
the risk of di::rupting budgetary execution. 
The  possibility  of a  Guarantee  Fund  mechanism,  backed  by  a  Reserve 
for Guarantees of a  fixed  amount,  could  also  be  considered.  However, 
the  Commission  feels  that  this  is  not  advisable  for  reasons  of 
cost-effectiveness  as  it  would  lead  to  budgetary  resources  being 
mobilized prematurely. - 22 -' 
These  considerations  on  the  budgetary  treatment  of  borrowing  and  lending 
operations  should  be  seen  as  one  part  of  the  Commission's  efforts  to 
improve the general framework of these operations. 
Thus,  the  Commission  also  intends  shortly to  propose  a  proposal  framework 
Decision announced in the document COM (92) 2000.  This framework Decision 
should  set  strict  eligibility  and  conditiona'iity  criteria  for  medium-term 
financial assistance to third countries.  " 
In  conclusion, the Commission: 
1.  provided  there  is  a  consensus  on  the  principle  between the  CommunitY 
institutions  in  the  Interinstitutional  Agreement,  will  present  a 
proposal for the amendment of the Financial  Regulation 
- amending,  as  indicated  in  Annex I,  the  presentation  of  the  bud'get 
documents  and  incorporating  all  prov1s1ons  relating .  to 
borrowing/lending  operations  in  an  additional  title  containing 
specific provisions; 
- stipulating  that,  when  adopting  the  budget,  the  budgetary  authority 
will  make  an  assessment of the  conditions  of implementation  of the 
borrowing/lending operations; 
2.  will  present  a  six-monthly  report  on  guarantees  by  the  end  of 
February and  by the end of October each year; 
3.  will  present,  as  part  of  the  renewal  of  the  Interinstitutional 
Agreement,  a  proposal  to  establish  a  Reserve  for  Guarantees  forming 
part  of  the  reserve  for  exceptional  expenditure  in  the  Financial 
Perspective 1  993-9  7;  .. , 
4.  will  present  a  proposal  to  amend  the  financial  rules  so  that  a 
Guarantee Fund,  backed  up  by a  Reserve for Guarantees,  can be set up 
if  the  budget  authority,  after  assessing  the  cost  and  the  complexity 
of implementation,  decides that such a fund  is  necessary. ANNEX  I 
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MIIXliUI NIIIAl RISKS  Rll TIE  CXIIUiln IILDGET 
(Estimation in EQJ  millions based on all operations- disbrsements, decisions l!ld Conmission proposals) 
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  TOTAL 
tEMSER  STATES 
CAPITAL 
A.  Balance of payments 
1.  France  30  30 
2.  Greece  I  210  635  633  200  1678 
3.  Greece  II  1  500  600  500  600  2200 
B.  Structural  loans 
4.  Euratom and  NCI  762  1063  1465  740  530  443  1048  171  52  6238 
5.  EIB/Mediterr!Wlelll,  Old 
protocols,  Spain,  Greece,  108  103  97  83  76  70  f:B  53  48  707 
·Portugal 
capital sub-total  1074  1801  2195  1023  606  1013  1717  724  700  10853 
INTEREST 
A.  Balance of payments 
1. ·France  3  3 
2.  Greece  I  115  89  202  15  421 
3.  Greece  II  1  125  185  215  215  215  166  106  60  1287 
B.  Structural  loans 
4.  Euratom and  NCl  568  481  393  257  194  150  112  25  10  2190 
5.  EIB/Medi terranelll  - Old 
protocols,  Spain,  Greece  75  65  55  .  47  39  32  26  20  15  374 
Portugal 
Interest sub-total  761  760  835  534  448  397  304  151  85  4275 
MEMBER  STATES  - TOTAL  1835  2561  3030  1557  1054  1410  2021  875  785  15128 
NON-MEMBER  COUNTRIES 
CAPITAL 
A.  Financial  Assistance. 
6.  Hungary  I  350  260  260  870 
7.  HLf19<lry  I I  100  80  180 
II.  CSfR  190  185  375 
Y.  Bulgaria  150  140  2110 
10.  Romania  185  190  375 
1t.  Israel  160  160 
12.  Algeria  250  150  400 
B.  Guarantees 
13.  E  I B/Medi terranean  81  92  99  113  119  124  189  267  307  1391 
14.  EIB/Eastern Europe  7  22  43  68  94  234 
C.  Aid CIS 
15.  Guarantee SOOm  136  136  136  408 
16.  B/l 1  .250m  416  416  418  1250 
Capital·sub-total  81  92  515  665  1030  542  1092  955  961  5933 
INTEREST 
A.  Financial  Assistance 
6.  Hungary  I  37  63  89  89  89  52  26  445 
7.  HLflgary  I I  10  18  18  18  18  18  18  8  126 
8.  CSFR  19  38  38  38  38  38  19  228 
9.  Bulgaria  15  29  29  29  29  29  29  14  203 
10.  Romania  10  38  38  38  38  38  38  19  257 
1L  Israel  8  16  16  16  16  16  88 
12.  Algeria  25  40  40  40  40  40  15  15  255 
B.  Guarantees 
13.  f IB/Medi tcrranean  107  130  133  148  177  220  2h4  30\  32S  180S 
14.  UR/lol,;lcm Europr.  11  30  54  84  113  13S  146  147  Tl.O 
C.  Aid CIS 
15.  Guarantee 500m  20  41  31  92 
16.  B/l  1.250m  25  117  76  34  252 
Interest sub-total  144  336  589  577  563  564  iJ)4  566  528  4471 
NON-MEMBER  COUNTRIES  - TOTAL  225  428  1104  1242  1593  1106  1696  1521  1489  10404 
~M>  TOTAL  2060  2989  4134  2799  2647  2516  3717  2396  2274  25532 
(of  which  Eastern Europe)  37  173  816  925  1241  706  m  938  692  6305 
(of  which  other non-merrber  COl.ntries)  188  255  288  317  352  400  919  583  797  4099 